Articles

Contact

Links

Case Law

Security

THOMAS v SAWKINS
[DIVISIONAL COURT]
[1935] 2 K B 249
HEARING-DATES: 30 May 1935
30 May 1935

Police - Right to enter private premises - To attend meeting to which public invited - Reasonable anticipation of misdemeanour or breach of the peace.

HEADNOTE:
The appellant was one of the conveners of a meeting held to protest against a Bill then before Parliament in a private hall which had been hired for the purpose by one of the other conveners of the meeting. The meeting was extensively advertised and the public were invited to attend it and no charge for admission was made. The respondent, a police sergeant, and other police officers were refused admission to the hall, but they insisted on entering it and remaining there during the meeting. No criminal offence was committed by any person at the meeting, nor was there any actual breach of the peace or disorder, but the respondent and the other officers had reasonable grounds for believing that, if they were not present at the meeting, seditious speeches would be made and that incitements to violence and breaches of the peace would occur:-

Held, that the respondent and the other officers were entitled, in the execution of their duty to prevent the commission of any offence or breach of the peace, to enter and remain on the premises.

Humphries v. Connor (1864) 17 Ir. C. L. R. 1; O'Kelly v. Harvey (1883) 14 L. R. Ir. 105; Lansbury v. Riley [1914] 3 K. B. 229, and dictum of Fitzgerald J. in Reg. v. Queen's County Justices (1882) 10 L. R. Ir. 294, at p. 301, applied.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by Glamorgan (Newcastle and Ogmore) justices.
At a court of summary jurisdiction sitting at Bridgend on September 13, 1934, an information was preferred by the appellant, Alun Clydwyn Thomas, against the respondent, James Sawkins, a sergeant of the Glamorgan County Police Force, under s. 42 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, alleging that, on August 17, 1934, the respondent unlawfully assaulted and beat the appellant.

On the hearing of the information the following facts were proved or admitted:-

On August 17, 1934, a public meeting was held at the Large Hall of the Caerau Library to protest against the Incitement to Disaffection Bill then before Parliament and to demand the dismissal of the chief constable of the county of Glamorgan, at which meeting between 500 and 700 persons were present. The chairman of the meeting was one Richard Davies.

On August 9 the appellant had addressed a public meeting at Nantymoel from which he had asked police officers to withdraw. On their refusing to do so, he had lodged at the police station a written complaint against the action of the officers. On August 14 the appellant addressed a public meeting at Caerau at which he threatened physically to eject the police if they attended the then forthcoming meeting on August 17. On August 15 the appellant addressed a public meeting at Maesteg, about two miles distant from Caerau, at which he said: "If it were not for the presence of these people" - pointing to certain police officers who were present - "I could tell you a hell of a lot more."

The Caerau Library Hall was used for meetings and was hired for the meeting of August 17 by one Fred Thomas, who paid for the hire thereof. The public were invited to attend the meeting, but no charge for admission was made. The meeting was advertised extensively by posters in red chalk on paper and by the chalking of pavements by which the public were invited to "come in crowds." The appellant and Fred Thomas were two of the conveners of the meeting, but no evidence was given of who the other conveners, if any, were, or of the authority of the appellant to act on their behalf.

The respondent, with Police Inspector Richard Parry and Sergeant Stephen Lawrence, of the Glamorgan County Police Force, presented himself for admission to the meeting, and was informed by Fred Thomas at the entrance that he had been instructed not to admit any police officers. In spite of that the officers entered the hall and seated themselves in the front row seats of the meeting.

On his arrival, the appellant requested the police officers to leave the premises, but they refused to do so. The appellant then went to the police station, where he lodged a complaint against the officers for refusing to leave the meeting and gave an undertaking that "no breaches of the peace will occur if the police are immediately withdrawn." The appellant returned to the meeting, read the complaint to the police officers, and again requested them to leave, but they refused to do so.

The appellant then stated that the police officers would be ejected, and he laid his hand on Inspector Parry to eject him. The respondent thereupon pushed the appellant's arm and hand from Parry, saying: "I won't allow you to interfere with my superior officer." As a result of the entrance of other police officers, no further attempt was made to eject the police. In attempting to remove Parry, the appellant used no more force than was reasonably necessary for that purpose and the respondent used no more force than was reasonably necessary (assuming that he and Parry had a right to be there) to protect Parry and to prevent him from being ejected.

It was not alleged by the respondent that any criminal offence was committed by any person at the meeting at any time, apart from what was alleged in the summons. There was not in or about the meeting, and there had not been before the entrance of the police, any actual breach of the peace or disorder. The appellant and Fred Thomas were lawfully in possession of the hall and gave permission to members of the public to enter it.

On the part of the appellant it was contended that the premises on which the meeting was held were private premises to which neither the police nor the public had right of access; that any police officer who entered, or remained at, the meeting against the will of the conveners of the meeting was a trespasser; that the appellant was entitled to remove the respondent and other police officers, using no more force than was reasonably necessary; and that the respondent, in resisting removal and in the circumstances stated, committed an unlawful assault on the appellant.

On the part of the respondent it was contended that he had a legal right to enter the hall and remain there against the wishes of the appellant and Fred Thomas, and that he and the other police officers did so remain because, in the judgment of himself and the other officers (based on their experience and knowledge of previous meetings organized by the Communist Party at Caerau), it was to be anticipated that the meeting would become an unlawful assembly or a riot, or that breaches of the peace would take place, to the alarm of the residents of Caerau, and that seditious and inflammatory speeches were likely to be made at the meeting.

The justices were of opinion that the respondent and the other police officers had reasonable grounds for believing that, if they were not present at the meeting, there would be seditious speeches and other incitements to violence and breaches of the peace would occur; that they were entitled to enter and remain in the hall and meeting; and that, in consequence, the respondent did not unlawfully assault and beat the appellant. They accordingly dismissed the information and the appellant appealed.

COUNSEL:
Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps K.C., Dingle Foot and Granville Slackfor appellant. The justices were wrong in not convicting the respondent. The general duties of a constable are to preserve the King's peace and with that object to keep watch and ward and to bring criminals to justice: Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. xxii., p. 497; Blackstone, Com., vol. i., p. 356; Stat. of Winchester, 1285. To perform those duties he may enter private premises without a warrant only to take a felon, where felony has been committed and a particular person is reasonably suspected to be the offender, where a felony is likely, or about, to be committed, where he hears an affray on the premises, or to pursue and arrest those who have taken part in an affray: Stone's Justices' Manual, 1935, p. 208; Burn's Justice of the Peace, 30th ed., vol. i., pp. 301, 303. In addition there are certain statutory provisions which empower a constable to enter private premises, e.g., Stat. 36 Geo. 3, c. 8, s. 14; Canal Boats Act, 1840, s. 9; Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, s. 81; but those instances show that an enactment was considered to be necessary to give the constable in the cases specified a right which he did not possess at common law. There is no authority empowering a constable to enter private premises merely because he has a reasonable belief that an offence or a breach of the peace may be committed thereon.

Vaughan Williams K.C. and Dapho Powell for the respondent. The justices were right. The respondent was entitled to be present at the meeting. A constable by his oath swears to cause the peace to be preserved and to prevent the commission of all offences. Where, therefore, the police have reasonable grounds for believing that an offence may be committed or a breach of the peace occur, they have a right to enter private premises to prevent the commission of the offence or the occurrence of the breach of the peace. If that were not so, it would be extremely difficult for the police to exercise their powers of watch and ward and their duty of preventive justice. Their position would be reduced to impossibility and a great increase in disorder would result. In Humphries v. Connor n(1) it was held that a police officer was entitled to commit a technical assault on a person to preserve the public peace. That case was approved in O'Kelly v. Harvey n(2) , where it was held a good defence in an action of assault that the defendant, a justice of the peace, believed on reasonable grounds that a breach of the peace would occur if a meeting were allowed to continue and laid his hand on the plaintiff in trying to disperse the meeting. The latter case is one example of the duty of "preventive justice" which devolves on magistrates and police alike, another example being the duty of a magistrate to bind a person to be of good behaviour to prevent the commission of reasonably apprehended breaches of the peace: Lansbury v. Riley. n(3)

[They also referred to Handcock v. Baker n(4) and Hodder v. Williams. n(5) ]
Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, in reply, referred to Duncan v. Dowding. n(6)
PANEL: LORD HEWART C.J., AVORY and LAWRENCE JJ
JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD HEWART C.J
JUDGMENT-1:
LORD HEWART C.J: It is apparent that the conclusion of the justices in this case consisted of two parts. One part was a conclusion of fact that the respondent and the police officers who accompanied him believed that certain things might happen at the meeting which was then about to be held. There were ample materials on which the justices could come to that conclusion. The second part of the justices' finding is no less manifestly an expression of opinion. Finding the facts as they do, and drawing from those facts the inference which they draw, they go on to say that the officers were entitled to enter and to remain on the premises on which the meeting was being held.

Against that determination, it is said that it is an unheard-of proposition of law, and that in the books no case is to be found which goes the length of deciding, that, where an offence is expected to be committed, as distinct from the case of an offence being or having been committed, there is any right in the police to enter on private premises and to remain there against the will of those who, as hirers or otherwise, are for the time being in possession of the premises. When, however, I look at the passages which have been cited from Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 356, and from the judgments in Humphries v. Connor n(1) and O'Kelly v. Harvey n(2) and certain observations of Avory J. in Lansbury v. Riley n(3) , I think that there is quite sufficient ground for the proposition that it is part of the preventive power, and, therefore, part of the preventive duty, of the police, in cases where there are such reasonable grounds of apprehension as the justices have found here, to enter and remain on private premises. It goes without saying that the powers and duties of the police are directed, not to the interests of the police, but to the protection and welfare of the public.

It was urged in one part of the argument of Sir Stafford Cripps that what the police did here amounted to a trespass. It seems somewhat remarkable to speak of trespass when members of the public who happen to be police officers attend, after a public invitation, a public meeting which is to discuss as one part of its business the dismissal of the chief constable of the county. It is elementary that a good defence to an action for trespass is to show that the act complained of was done by authority of law, or by leave and licence.

I am not at all prepared to accept the doctrine that it is only where an offence has been, or is being, committed, that the police are entitled to enter and remain on private premises. On the contrary, it seems to me that a police officer has ex virtute officii full right so to act when he has reasonable ground for believing that an offence is imminent or is likely to be committed.

I think, therefore, that the justices were right and that this appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGMENTBY-2: AVORY J
JUDGMENT-2:
AVORY J: I am of the same opinion. I think that it is very material in this particular case to observe that the meeting was described as a public meeting, that it was extensively advertised, and that the public were invited to attend. There can be no doubt that the police officers who attended the meeting were members of the public and were included in that sense in the invitation to attend. It is true that those who had hired the hall for the meeting might withdraw their invitation from any particular individual who was likely to commit a breach of the peace or some other offence, but it is quite a different proposition to say that they might withdraw the invitation from police officers who might be there for the express purpose of preventing a breach of the peace or the commission of an offence.

With regard to the general question regarding the right of the police to attend the meeting notwithstanding the opposition of the promoters, I cannot help thinking that that right follows from the description of the powers of a constable which Sir Stafford Cripps relies on in Stone's Justices' Manual, 1935, p. 208, where it is said that when a constable hears an affray in a house he may break in to suppress it and may, in pursuit of an affrayer, break in to arrest him. If he can do that, I cannot doubt that he has a right to break in to prevent an affray which he has reasonable cause

to suspect may take place on private premises. In other words, it comes within his duty, as laid down by Blackstone (Commentaries, vol. i., p. 356), to keep the King's peace and to keep watch and ward. In my view, the right was correctly expressed in Reg. v. Queen's County Justices n(1) , where Fitzgerald J. said: "The foundation of the jurisdiction [to bind persons to be of good behaviour] is very remote, and probably existed prior to the statute of 1360-61; but whatever its foundation may be, or by whatever language conveyed, we are bound to regard and expound it by the light of immemorial practice and of decision, and especially of direct modern decisions. It may be described as a branch of preventive justice, in the exercise of which magistrates are invested with large judicial discretionary powers, for the maintenance of order and the preservation of the public peace." That passage was expressly approved in Lansbury v. Riley n(2) , and the statement of the law which it contains was adopted by Lord Alverstone C.J. in Wise v. Dunning. n(3) In principle I think that there is no distinction between the duty of a police constable to prevent a breach of the peace and the power of a magistrate to bind persons over to be of good behaviour to prevent a breach of the peace.

I am not impressed by the fact that many statutes have expressly given to police constables in certain circumstances the right to break open or to force an entrance into private premises. Those have all been cases in which a breach of the peace was not necessarily involved and it, therefore, required express statutory authority to empower the police to enter. In my opinion, no express statutory authority is necessary where the police have reasonable grounds to apprehend a breach of the peace, and in the present case I am satisfied that the justices had before them material on which they could properly hold that the police officers in question had reasonable grounds for believing that, if they were not present, seditious speeches would be made and/or that a breach of the peace would take place. To prevent any such offence or a breach of the peace the police were entitled to enter and to remain on the premises, and I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGMENTBY-3: LAWRENCE J
JUDGMENT-3:
LAWRENCE J: As my Lord has pointed out, our judgment proceeds on the particular facts of this case, and on those facts I agree with the conclusion. I will only add that I am unable to follow the distinction which Sir Stafford Cripps has drawn between the present matter and the cases which have been cited. If a constable in the execution of his duty to preserve the peace is entitled to commit an assault, it appears to me that he is equally entitled to commit a trespass.