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Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd and another v Curtin and others
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
The Times 11 December 1997, (Transcript: Beverley Nunnery)
HEARING-DATES: 28 NOVEMBER 1997
28 NOVEMBER 1997

COUNSEL:
T Lawson-Cruttenden for the Respondents; P roth QC and J Simor for the Applicants
PANEL: EADY J
JUDGMENTBY-1: EADY J
JUDGMENT-1:
EADY J: At the request of the parties, this judgment is given in open court.
The background to the applications before me is a campaign of harassment against the first plaintiff by a large number of anti-vivisection campaigners. The picture that emerges from the evidence is indeed a very disturbing one. In an affidavit sworn on 23 September 1997 in support of an application under the Protection of Harassment Act 1997, Mr Peter Dawes describes a sustained and menacing campaign which undoubtedly has very worrying implications, not only for the plaintiff but also for the community at large, not least because of the problems in maintaining the rule of law and in protecting law abiding citizens in their homes and work places.

The first plaintiff is described in that affidavit at para 2, as:
... a company which undertakes research under contract, such research involving the use of animals. The First Plaintiff operates under strict guidelines imposed by the Home Office and Good Laboratory Practice Regulations and Standards promulgated by Governmental Authorities and has regular inspections from Home Office Officials and other regulatory authorities to ensure that these guidelines are complied with. The Home Office is primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the Animal (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.

"3. The principal sites at which the First Plaintiff conducts its activities are at:
"(a) Woolley Road, Alconbury, Huntingdon, Cambs ('the Huntingdon site');
"(b) Stamford Lodge, Altrincham Road, Wilmslow, Cheshire ('the Wilmslow site');
"(c) Elm Farm, Occold, Eye, Suffolk ('the Eye site'). These three sites are set out in the Plans respectively marked A, B and C attached to the draft Order at Exhibit 'PD1.'

"4. The Plaintiffs have experienced a long history of demonstrations from persons loosely described as Animal Rights Protesters and those concerned with the abolition of vivisection or the abolition of experimentation on animals generally. The Plaintiffs have always respected the right of peaceful demonstration and the right to free expression in a democratic society. However, the Plaintiffs are now extremely concerned by what appears to be the escalation and perpetration of a campaign of harassment which is being undertaken against its sites and of greater concern to its directors, officers and employees.

"5. The immediate background to the present situation is a hunger strike presently being conducted by Barry Horne presently in HMP Bristol. Mr. Horne's hunger strike is at an advanced stage and may continue to provoke serious incidents of harassment. Although his hunger strike is directed at the Government, in support of a change of legislation concerning animal research, it is clear from the documentation being produced in the name of "Barry Horne Support Campaign" that his supporters are using his strike to direct a campaign of harassment against the Plaintiff."

At para 7, Mr Dawes deposes to the fact that it is the stated aim of a large number of animal rights organisations to effect disruption, and to bring about the closure of the plaintiff's business at the three sites referred to above. He then goes on to describe a number of serious and worrying incidents which have occurred in the past. It is necessary for me to refer to those in some detail in the light of the applications which are now before me, and I quote:

1. The Huntingdon Site
"(a) On 7 September 1997, a permanent protest camp"
- and I interject that this has been referred to during the course of the hearing before me as "Camp Rena" -
was set up outside the Huntingdon site. On 21 September 1997, this was advertised by Animal Rights Coalition News in the following terms 'Permanent Protect Camp to be set up at Huntingdon Life Sciences in support of Barry's hunger strike'.

"(b) Since 7 September 1997, the site has experienced continual 24 hour demonstrations from Animal Rights Activists who have numbered from between 10 to 100. The aim of the demonstrators is to prevent access to and from the Plaintiff's site and intimidation of persons attempting to gain access to and leave the Plaintiff's premises.

"(c) The intimidation, inter alia, involves standing in front of cars, shouting obscenities at the drivers, shouting threats like, "We know who you are and where you live", photographing persons using video cameras, taking down the registration numbers of vehicles both within the Plaintiff's site and entering and leaving the site, and following vehicles after they have left the Plaintiff's site. Obscenities have also been directed at staff whilst on the Plaintiff's site.

"(d) The intimidation referred to in (c) above greatly concerns the Plaintiff who takes seriously the duty of care which they owe to their employees, clients and other third parties. Of particular concern to the Plaintiff is the fact that officers of the Plaintiff have repeatedly observed demonstrators taking down the registration numbers of cars both inside and outside the site and the Plaintiff is concerned that this information is sought by the demonstrators in order to progress and perpetrate the campaign of harassment against the Plaintiff, its employees and others. Additionally, officers of the Plaintiff have witnessed demonstrators leaving from the camp in order to follow employees leaving the site. The principal incidents of taking down registration number plates and of following persons leaving the site have occurred since 7 September.

"(e) Of grave concern is the break-in which occurred on Sunday, 21 September 1997 when 3 demonstrators broke into the site and presently take up positions on the roof of one of the laboratories. I am aware that one of these demonstrators is the second Defendant called Max Watson. At the time of dictating this affidavit, the three demonstrators continue to trespass on this site.

"(f) This break in has been accompanied by a demonstration of up to 120 activists. The demonstrating is clearly aggressive and it was necessary on Sunday 21 September at about 17.00 for the Police to organise a safe convoy to allow the Plaintiff's employees to leave the site. A number of cars belonging to the Plaintiff's employees were damaged, rocks were thrown by protestors and it appears that two protestors were injured. There is now produced to me and marked 'PD2' copies of incidents sheets prepared anonymously by various employees of the Plaintiff. I am aware that the incident sheets are provided by bona- fide employees and to the best of my knowledge and belief are true.

"2. The Wilmslow Site

"(a) The harassment described at the Huntingdon site since 7 September 1997 has also occurred, but at a more serious level, at the Wilmslow site. The demonstrators are clearly perpetrating a campaign of harassment which is clearly anarchical and I quote from the Animal Rights Coalition News which records an incident which occurred on 16 September 1997 as follows -
'on Tuesday 35 North West Activists were besieging HLS's Cheshire site in Wilmslow, again in solidarity with Barry. Using a familiar tactic they arrived at 7.30 a.m. forcing the laboratory to contact all its workers and organise a rendezvous point nearby. From here the workers are given a police escort. The traffic is stopped and the protestors moved out of the way, all leading to expense and waste of time'.

"(b) It is now common for the police to assist in the safe conduct of convoys. A staff convoy had to be arranged at short notice at 8.45 a.m. on 16th September 1997.

"(c) What is more serious about the Wilmslow site is the incidents which have occurred in relation to the four private addresses in Cheshire, about which I deal below.

"3. The Eye Site

"(a) Up to now, no incidents have occurred at this site. However it is feared that the campaign of harassment will shortly extend to this site and this is why orders are sought to protect it. However, I believe the protestors have scheduled to meet at this site on 4 October 1997 and that they may now meet beforehand.

"4. Directors Private Homes."

I interject here that a number of incidents are referred to in relation to named individuals but I do not propose to name them in the course of reciting this affidavit. I continue with the quotation:

(a) On 19 June 1997 a demonstration took place outside the house of [Mr. A], a Director of the Second Plaintiff at ... [His] name and address is set out on a map of London entitled 'Where to find London's Animal Abusers', and appears to be published by a number of Animal Rights Organisation including London Animal Rights News and Animal Rights Coalition. His telephone number is given at the bottom of a London Animal Rights News Letter dated July/August 1997 and clearly invites activists to telephone his home address.

"(b) On 29 July 1997, the home of [Mr. B], another Director of the Second Plaintiff, was visited"
- and the address is given.
I quote from the report of this visit published in the Animal Rights Coalition dated 21 September 1997 as follows:
'According to reports we have received, ALF activists went to B's home later on in the evening (of 29 July 1997) and several windows in his house were smashed.'

"Mr. B has recently received telephone calls threatening his life.

"(c) On 15th August 1997, there was a demonstration at the home of [Mr. C], also a Director of the Second Plaintiff. I quote from the Animal Rights Coalition News Letter for 21 September 1997 -

'About a dozen activists turned up at [an address] to inform Mr. C's neighbours what scum they live near to ... and the next day we received an anonymous report that the ALF had visited C's house later in the evening, stuck a garden hose through a window that was left ajar and turned the water on.'

"5. Staff Private Homes

"(a) [An address is given in Cheshire] At 9.40 p.m. on 4 September 1997 Animal Rights Protestors visited this address with bright lights shining and sought to photograph the occupier with a video camera. More seriously, at 7.20 a.m. on 15 September, masked demonstrators arrived outside this property disturbing the neighbours, and although the police were called, no demonstrators were arrested. The occupiers of this property, one of whom is an employee of the Plaintiff, has asked the Plaintiff to obtain the exclusion zone order sought in relation to this property.

"(b) [Another address is given in Manchester] At 9.15 p.m. on 9 September, this property received a visit from four protestors who left before the police arrived. On the following morning at 6.30 a.m., the occupier was awakened by something rattling against his bedroom window. There was a knock on his front door and it is thought that the four men who had visited the evening before were present wearing masks and hoods. A third incident occurred at midnight on the following day namely 11/12 September when the contents of the rubbish bin at this property were scattered over the drive way of the property. In addition, plants and shrubs in the front garden were damaged. One of the occupiers of this property is employed by the Plaintiff and has asked the Plaintiff to obtain the exclusion zone order sought in relation to this property.

"(c) [Another address is given in Stockport] An incident occurred outside this property at 9.00 p.m. on 5 September which involved at least 11 protestors who knocked on the door and left before the police were called.

"(d) [Another address is given in Stockport] At 7.20 a.m. on 8 September, four hooded protestors visited this property. The occupiers are a married couple with two children ... The masked men spat over the family car and I am informed that one of the children was very distressed by this incident. Of great concern is that it was repeated at 11 a.m. on that day, and involved 4 men some of whom were hooded. The occupier, who is an employee of the Plaintiff, has asked the Plaintiff to obtain an exclusion zone order sought and has received complaints from neighbours who are also concerned.

"(e) In addition, incidents involving other employees have occurred in the Manchester area as follows:"
The complainants wish to remain anonymous, the incidents being as follows.

(i) 7 September 12 protestors at 6 pm.
(ii) 10 September 4 protestors at 7.25 a.m.
(iii) 10 September protestors at 10.05 a.m.
(iv) 12 September 10 hooded protestors at 10 a.m.
(v) 13 September 6 hooded protestors at 4.15 p.m."

Then, at para 10, it is said that:
As a result of this campaign of harassment members of staff are receiving numerous hate letters. Copies of these letters are now produced to me marked 'PD3'. I have already referred to the fact that obscenities are constantly being shouted at the Plaintiff's employees examples of these being set out in the incident reports at 'PD2'."

In the light of those matters, the plaintiffs sought relief from the court. An ex parte application was made on an emergency basis to Timothy Walker J. on 22 September 1997 before a writ was issued. Those steps were taken in the light of the break-in and occupation of the premises in Huntingdon the day before. Injunctive relief was sought in very wide terms against some 12 individuals or groups, some of which appear to have legal personality, although others did not.

Among the persons concerned were the third defendants, the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, which is a company limited by guarantee. The judge refused all relief. He came to the conclusion that injunctive relief was inappropriate because: (1) there was no evidence of harassment by human defendants; (2) the plaintiffs were not entitled to a remedy against bodies lacking a legal personality; (3) the plaintiffs ought to call in the police and (4) an injunction ex parte was, in any event, inappropriate.

Later the same day, the Court of Appeal was moved, also ex parte, between 6.00 pm. and 7.45 pm., that court consisting of Lords Justices Schiemann and Ward. Reliance was placed primarily on the provisions of the 1997 Act. It is necessary for me to refer to the terms of these provisions, which were drafted, I am told, in some haste and in very wide terms. They were primarily directed towards the prevention of stalking.

It is, of course, the duty of the courts to give full effect to those provisions, although there is much scope for debate as to how they should be implemented, and no doubt they will require careful analysis as and when they come to be applied.

I propose to read short extracts from the statute (although not all of it is yet in effect). In particular I refer to s.1, which is introduced with the words

"Prohibition of harassment":
(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct -
(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.
"(2) For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.
"(3) Sub-section (1) does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows -
"(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime,
"(b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment, or
"(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable."

Section 2: Offence of harassment:
(1) A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence.
"(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a find not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both."
At (3), there is a provision inserting additional wording into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which I need not read.
Section 3: Civil Remedy:
(1) An actual or apprehended breach of section 1 may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question.
"(2) On such a claim, damages may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment.
"(3) Where -
"(a) in such proceedings the High Court or a county court grants an injunction for the purpose of restraining the defendant from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment, and
"(b) the plaintiff considers that the defendant has done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction,
"the plaintiff may apply for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant.
"(4) An application under subsection (3) may be made -
"(a) where the injunction was granted by the High Court, to a judge of that court, and
"(b) where the injunction was granted by a county court, to a judge or district judge of that or any other county court.
"(5) The judge or district judge to whom an application under subsection (3) is made may only issue a warrant if-
"(a) the application is substantiated on oath, and
"(b) the judge or district judge has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant has done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction.
"(6) Where -
"(a) the High Court or a county court grants an injunction for the purpose mentioned in subsection (3)(a), and
"(b) without reasonable excuse the defendant does anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction,
"he is guilty of an offence."
Subsections (7) and (8) refer to the inter-relationship between these provisions and the law of contempt. Subsection (9) is in the following terms:
A person guilty of an offence under subsection (6) is liable -
"(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both, or
"(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both."

I turn finally to s 7, which is the interpretation section, and subsection (2) of that provides that:
References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress."

Other provisions are:
(3) A 'course of conduct' must involve conduct on at least two occasions.
"(4) 'Conduct' includes speech."

The order which was granted by the Court of Appeal was in much more limited terms than that which had been sought. It is to be found in the bundle at pp 5-6. The material part of the order was that the defendants, who included, of course, only six of the original defendants who were named in the proceedings, including the third named defendants being the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection. I quote:

(1) the Defendants be restrained from any course of conduct which amounts to harassment within the meaning of The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 of the Plaintiffs and in particular from:-
"(a) assaulting, molesting, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the employees of the Plaintiffs;
"(b) approaching within 50 yards of the Plaintiffs' employees homes, in particular those at..."
- and various addressed are given in the Manchester area.
(c) from coming or remaining or trespassing on the land coloured red, blue, and yellow on the Plan 'A' annexed hereto being the land situated in the vicinity of Woolley Road, Alconbury, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire ... comprising:
"(i) the Plaintiff's research centre ... (the land coloured blue ...;
"(ii) the land owned by the Plaintiff's neighbours and partly surrounding the plaintiffs' said research centre (the land coloured red and yellow ...);
"(d) from coming or trespassing on the land coloured red on the plan 'B' annexed hereto being land at the Plaintiff's research centre situated at Stamford Lodge, Altrincham Road, Wilmslow ... and comprising:-
"(i) the Plaintiff's research centre at Stamford Lodge aforesaid (the land coloured red ...)
"(e) from coming or remaining or trespassing on the land coloured red and yellow on Plan 'C' annexed hereto being the land at the Plaintiff's research centre situated at Elm Farm, Occold, Eye, Suffolk .. and comprising:-
"(i) the Plaintiff's research centre at Elm Farm ... (the land edged red on plan 'C');
"(ii) Land owned by the Plaintiff's neighbours in
front of the Plaintiff's research centre (the land coloured yellow on plan 'C'.

"(2) That there be substituted service of this Order by displaying copies of the same in prominent positions along the boundary of the properties referred to in Clauses 1(c) (d) and (e) above on the Plans 'A', 'B' and 'C; annexed hereto."

The costs were reserved and it was also provided that any of the defendants might apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this order, but if they wished to do so, they must first inform the plaintiff's solicitors in writing at least 24 hours beforehand.

The writ was served the next day, claiming injunctive relief in much wider terms. I need not refer to the terms of the claim for an injunction and the writ itself, which are very lengthy. Suffice to say that it would have forbidden any comment or discussion about the plaintiff's business, among other things.

The narrative may now conveniently be continued by reference to the judgment of Schiemann LJ in the reserved judgment of the Court of Appeal of 15 October 1997, explaining why the court had granted the relief to which I have referred on the evening of 22 September, albeit on a much more limited basis than that which had been sought, both as to the scope of the injunction and as to the parties against whom it was granted. I quote two short passages. The first is from p 5 of the transcript in the following terms.

The difficulties which the plaintiffs face are essentially difficulties in identification. It has to be said that while the evidence of harassment is ample, the evidence that any particular person or any particular organisation is responsible is very thin. We were told by the plaintiffs' advocate that Mr. Curtin, the first defendant, was organising the protests complained of by using a loud hailer; and that Mr. Watson, the second defendant, was one of those on the roof. The third defendant is the primary anti-vivisection organisation of the U.K. and the plaintiffs believe that many of its members were concerned in the demonstration. The fourth defendant, the Animal Liberation Front, is identified in Animal Rights Coalition News as perpetrating criminal damage to the houses of the plaintiffs' directors. The eighth defendant appears to produce an internet site which advertises demonstrations aimed at the plaintiffs and appears to organise some if not all of the demonstrations. The same goes for London Animal Action, the twelfth defendant.

"A further difficulty which the plaintiffs have is that while the first two defendants are individuals and the third defendant is believed to be a company limited by guarantee the remaining defendants have no very clear legal personality and indeed some of them appear to be newspapers. What is clear is that these demonstrations and activities are organised to a greater or lesser degree by various groups of people who give themselves various names. In those circumstances the court is not powerless to protect persons who are threatened by such groups."

The Lord Justice continued shortly afterwards, and I am quoting from p 6 of the transcript:
The reason the applications are ex parte is because it is very difficult to pin down responsibility on anyone. The most effective way of dealing with the problem is to order a substituted service by fixing up notices in the appropriate places so that any potential demonstrator can see it and will know what he is permitted to do and what he is not permitted to do. The form of order which we have made is sufficiently clear for the police to be able to observe whether or not it is being obeyed. The defendants are restrained from any course of conduct which amounts to harassment within the meaning of the 1997 Act of the plaintiffs and various particular acts of harassment are set out and an order is made for substituted service of the order by displaying copies of the same in prominent positions along the boundary of the properties referred to in the order. Liberty is given to the defendants to apply to the Court to vary or discharge the order."

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden, who appears for the plaintiffs, asks me to conclude that nothing has changed since the judgment of the Court of Appeal, in the sense that it remains true that -
The third defendant is the primary anti-vivisection organisation of the U.K. and the plaintiffs believe that many of its members were concerned in the demonstration."

It is important to remember, however, that the Court of Appeal gave liberty to the defendants, including the third defendants, to apply to vary or discharge the order. That would have been pointless if all that was required was to show that the plaintiffs believed that many of the BUAV members were concerned in the demonstration. I interpret that passage in Schiemann LJ's judgment as meaning that on an urgent ex parte application that belief, which was to be deposed to on affidavit, was sufficient to justify an inference that the third defendants might be authorising or encouraging the harassment that was undoubtedly taking place. It must, however, in my judgment have been assumed that when the matter came back before a Queen's Bench Judge inter partes the third defendants (and indeed other parties) might provide evidence sufficient to rebut that inference. Not only would that be the normal assumption to make on the granting of an urgent ex parte injunction but also the Lord Justice acknowledged how "thin" the evidence was at that stage (in the passage which I have already quoted).

There are now before me two summonses. The first is that of the third defendants of 20 October 1997. That seeks relief in the following terms. That:

1. the indorsement on the writ be amended pursuant to RSC Order 18, rule 19 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court so as to remove the British Union for the Abolition for Vivisection as Third Defendant on the ground that the action against it is frivolous or vexatious and/or an abuse of process of the Court; and/or

"2. the injunction granted by the Court of Appeal on 22 September 1997 be varied so as to remove the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection from the Scope of the Order:"
and also there is a claim for costs.

There is also a summons issued by the plaintiffs of 7 November 1997, purportedly under s.356(6) of the Companies Act 1985. That seeks relief in the following terms:

That the Third defendant do forthwith provide to the Plaintiff a copy of its register of members, as defined in Clause 5 of its Articles of Association, and pursuant to the Companies Act 1985, S.356(6)."

There are no applications before me from any of the other parties.

Mr Roth, QC, for the third defendants submits as follows: that there is no basis for the allegation against the third defendants, and not only should the injunction be varied so as to exclude them but also they should have the claim struck out against them in accordance with the summons which I have just referred to. He says that the claim should have been dropped by the plaintiffs upon receipt of evidence submitted by Mr Baker on or about 17 October 1997, at the very latest.

Paragraph 11 of the affidavit of Mr Dawes, he submits, represents the high point of the plaintiff's claim against these defendants. Mr Dawes says:
It is my belief that all the Defendants are involved in perpetrating the campaign of harassment which I have described in this my affidavit. Some of the information received by me has come from the internet and there is now produced to me and marked 'PD4' a copy of various documents which I have recently taken either from the internet or from other published sources. I can however inform this court that the first and second Defendants have been identified by employees as persons who have been demonstrating at the Huntingdon site. The third defendant is the primary anti-vivisection organisation in the United Kingdom and I believe that many of its members are present demonstrating."

A further reference is made thereafter to other parties. It will immediately be noted that the wording which I have just read was echoed in the judgment of Schiemann LJ, which I quoted earlier. The paragraph contains the sentence deposing to Mr Dawes' belief, but no grounds of belief are specified.

I was referred to the well-known principles summarised in the White Book at paras 18/19/13, 18/19/15 and 18/19/21 and the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [1997] 3 All ER 171, [1997] 3 WLR 628 and particular at p 182. I was also asked to bear in mind specifically in the context of harassment the statements of principle to be found in the Court of Appeal judgments in Burris v Azadani [1995] 4 All ER 802, [1995] 1 WLR 1372. There are certain passages in particular to which I should refer, first of all in the judgment of Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) at p 1377A:

It is of course quite clear that the court cannot properly grant an injunction unless the plaintiff can show at least an arguable cause of action to support the grant, but subject to this overriding requirement s 37 [of the Supreme Court Act 1981], as has often been observed, is cast in the widest terms."

Also, at p 1380F-G the then Master of the Rolls said this:
There are two interests to be reconciled. One is that of the defendant. His liberty must be respected up to the point at which his conduct infringes, or threatens to infringe, the rights of the plaintiff. No restraint should be placed on him which is not judged to be necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff."

It is also worth observing, perhaps, that Schiemann LJ at p 1381G-H said this:
... there are in these cases two interests to be reconciled - that of the plaintiff not to be harassed and that of the defendant to be allowed to move freely along the highway. An exclusion zone order interferes with the latter in order to secure the former. On its face it forbids what are lawful actions. The defendant has rendered himself liable to such an order because of his previous harassing behaviour. Nonetheless, a judge imposing such an order must be careful not to interfere with the defendant's rights more than is necessary in order to protect the plaintiff's."

I have to consider, of course, in this case the extent to which, if at all, the third defendants have rendered themselves liable to an injunction because of any harassing or other previous behaviour. I also have to ask myself whether it is necessary that the injunction should be continued as against them in order to protect the rights of the plaintiffs.

It is now necessary for me to take account of the case advanced on behalf of the third defendants, which was not available either to Timothy Walker J. or to the Court of Appeal on 22 September 1997. In particular, I have in mind the contents of the affidavit of Mr Baker, the chief executive. I shall refer to paras 4-9 of that affidavit, which summarise their case conveniently. At para 4 he says this:
4. The BUAV was established in 1898 and incorporated in 1929. It is a company limited by guarantee. There is now produced and shown to me marked 'MJB1' a copy of its memorandum and articles of association and a copy of its Annual Review for 1996/7 marked 'MJB2'. It has a membership of about 5000. The members elect an Executive Committee ('EC'). EC members are all directors of the company.

"5. The BUAV campaigns peacefully for the abolition of vivisection. The mission statement for the organisation is set out on page 1 of the Annual Review (exhibit 'MJB2') and provides as follows:
"BUAV opposes animal experiments. We believe animals are entitled to respect and compassion which animal experiments deny them.
"BUAV campaigns peacefully for effective lasting change by challenging attitudes and actions towards animals worldwide." [His emphasis]

"6. The BUAV campaigns wholly within the law and unreservedly condemns illegal and unlawful campaigning activities. Paragraph 9 of the Articles of Association allows the EC to exclude from membership any member whose conduct is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the BUAV. Indeed, the membership as a whole have agreed at recent annual general meetings to changes facilitating the removal of members.

"7. Because we are a mass membership organisation, it is inevitable that we will sometimes attract those who, although having a different view about how best to advance the cause of anti-vivisection, see advantage in hiding behind the cloak of respectability which the BUAV affords them. Indeed, three years ago certain extreme elements mounted a concerted but ultimately unsuccessful take-over attempt.

"8. The EC recently reaffirmed its commitment to remove from membership of the BUAV anyone who we learn supports the use of violence. This was demonstrated by its decision in March this year to expel Niel Hansen from membership on the basis that he had been convicted of conspiracy to cause injury.

"9. It is, however, worth stressing that the vast majority of people who campaign against cruelty to animals (or for 'animal rights') do so within the law, contrary to the impression sometimes fostered by the media. Even amongst those who are willing to countenance breaking the law, only a tiny majority will, I believe, advocate the use of violence."

I need now to refer to the contents of letters which appear in the second bundle before me at pp 39 and 41. These were in similar terms and were written to people who had complained about the lack of involvement on the part of the BUAV, as it was perceived, in relation to the Barry Horne campaign to which I have already referred. One of the letters only need I read. It is dated 31 January 1997 and is in the following terms.

Many thanks for your recent letter regarding Barry Horne. I am very sorry to hear that you were upset that the BUAV was not represented at a protest at Bullington Prison.

"I feel I must explain the reason the decision to be represented was taken. It is BUAV policy that we do not support violent direct action nor those engaged in it. It was felt that it would be seen as condoning such action if we were represented at the protest.
"The BUAV is fighting for the abolition of all animal experiments by way of changing the law and raising awareness in a non-violent way.
"I hope that you can understand the reasoning behind this decision - and continue to support the BUAV - as we all believe that vivisection is wrong and must be stopped."

Mr Baker's affidavit was sworn, as I have already indicated on 17 October. In the light of the submissions made on behalf of the third defendant, I invited Mr Lawson-Cruttenden to say whether it remained his client's case that the third defendants were authorising harassment and violence. He said that was a "leading question". He accepted frankly that the plaintiff's case could only be based on the proposition that some of the third defendant's members or ex-members appeared to be involved. That is manifestly not enough in itself. It is not right to join an association or members' club in litigation merely on the footing that some of its members have misbehaved. In particular, reliance is placed upon a Miss Box. The material against Miss Box may well justify joining her as a party but it does not justify joining any association of which she happens to be a member unless there is a modicum of evidence to show that what she has done was done with the approval, authority or encouragement of that body. To adopt the words of Sir Thomas Bingham which I have already quoted, it must be shown that there is "at least an arguable cause of action" against the association or body concerned.

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden argued that it is enough for the court to be satisfied, as to the arguable cause of action, that this association has ends in common with Miss Box; that is to say, they have the common aim of stopping vivisection. The crucial question is not whether they have ends in common. It is whether they can show an arguable case that they have also means in common. The evidence before me shows the contrary; namely, that the third defendants have disavowed violence, harassment and the use of unlawful means. Mr Akehurst, the inquiry agent employed by the plaintiffs, says that he does not believe the sworn testimony of Mr Baker. That is an opinion he is entitled to hold, but it does not have the status of evidence. I am conscious that for maintaining a claim in being at this early stage, and for maintaining an interlocutory injunction, the evidence required against the third defendants does not have to be all that strong, but there must be something more than the plaintiff's disbelief.

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden says that I should be sceptical of what he described as the "angelic" front which the third defendants now adopt. But when I offered the opportunity of cross-examining Mr Baker in order to put to him that he was lying in his affidavit, he declined that opportunity. He relies on a number of incidents set out in the affidavits of Mr Akehurst, some of which are relatively recent, but the most significant of which go back in one case for 22 years and in the other case 15 years. There is nothing in Mr Akehurst's evidence that suggests to me that the evidence to which I have referred, in the affidavit of Mr Baker, should not be taken at face value.

These defendants, I am told, now wish to continue their discussions and campaigning, including at an international level, without the stigma of the injunction granted in connection with undoubtedly violent demonstrations. My attention was drawn to their booklet and, in particular, to a passage at p 5.
In October the European Coalition to End Animal Experiments, led by BUAV, held an historic meeting in Holland. Sixteen major European animal protection groups were joined by nine groups from the USA and Canada: agreement was reached to work towards an international cruelty-free standard for companies, and a worldwide campaign to combat cosmetic testing.

"In November we organised a seminar for companies to discuss the issues raised by the ban, the composition of a cruelty-free standard and the threat to cruelty-free labelling on cosmetic products. With speakers from The Co-op, the Body Shop, the Dr. Hadwen Trust and BUAV, the seminar was a great success and attracted delegates from a wide range of companies."

On the same page there is an account of their most recent significant campaign activity, outlining some of the areas where they claim to have made a major impact:

BUAV has:
"worked towards a worldwide campaign to combat cosmetic testing
"persuaded airlines to stop transporting primates
"uncovered the illegal use of stray and stolen pets in Belgian research
"challenged serious breaches of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 at Huntingdon Life Sciences Laboratory
"put the legal and scientific case against genetic engineering."

I also refer in that context to the affidavit of Mr Baker which is in the first of the bundles before me at p 104/105. What he says is this:
50. The inclusion of the BUAV within such Orders and proceedings can damage its reputation and its standing with national and international bodies. It can inevitably create an impression that BUAV must in some way be connected with those organisations or individuals that espouse violent protect, and indeed with these specific incidents. It can therefore also harm our recruitment of members.

"51. The BUAV is a respected organisation with a large membership. It relies on that continued status in order to influence the relevant authorities in the course of its legitimate democratic activities. Being subject to injunctions issued against it that wrongly imply that the BUAV is involved in violent and unlawful activities necessarily damages that reputation.

"52. We have recently been invited to meetings with Ministers in two Government departments, the Home Office and the DTI. We are in frequent demand from the media, both in this country and abroad, and I have recently appeared on, for example, Newsnight and The Today Programme. Our media, and therefore public, profile is damaged if we are associated, however, tangentially, with the sort of behaviour of Mr. Brown and Mr. Dawes complain.

"53. The fact that the BUAV was in no way involved with the incidents does not lessen the effect of being named in a court action in which serious allegations are made. Indeed, it inevitably damages us. We do not wish to be associated with the sorts of things of which Mr. Brown and Mr. Dawes complain, no matter how much we condemn the businesses in which they and their companies are engaged."
(I should explain that Mr Brown is a party to a different action which is not before me.)

It is said on behalf of the defendants that there were only two events in which they were involved at any relevant time; namely, on 23 April 1997 and 12 September 1997. Those were dealt with in evidence and I shall refer briefly to those passages. First of all, I was shown a letter of 18 April which was addressed on behalf of the BUAV to the plaintiffs, in anticipation of the demonstration which they were planning to hold on 23 April. It is in the following terms:
I am writing to inform you that members of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection will be holding a peaceful publicity event outside Huntingdon Life Sciences on Wednesday, 23rd April 1997. The event will take place between 11.30-1.00 pm.
"We would like to deliver a letter of protest from the BUAV regarding the recent revelations uncovered out of Huntingdon Life Sciences by the Channel 4 programme 'It's a dog's life,' and would be grateful if someone would be available to receive it.
"We will also be contacting the police to inform them of our intentions."
There was no reply to that letter, although in fact a letter was handed in to a security guard as promised on 23 April and that was in the following terms:
We are here today, in the run up to World Day for Laboratory Animals, to voice our concern following the TV program 'Countryside Undercover - It's a dog's life', screened on Channel 4 on 26th March 1997.
"The shocking evidence of animal cruelty and bad practices uncovered at Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) which breached the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act and the Code of Practice for the Housing and Care of Animals used in Scientific Procedures has provoked widespread public outrage.
"We were appalled by the level of cruelty inflicted on beagle dogs by members of staff at HLS. The fact that the people legally responsible for the health and well-being of the animals are the very same people who were inflicting the verbal and physical abuse is deeply disturbing. It appears that the brutality seen in the programme was indicative of a general attitude towards the animals at HLS and the failure of proper control by senior officials. Such behaviour is totally unacceptable in any civilized society.
"We welcome the fact that following on from the programme HLS suspended a number of employees, two of which also had their personal licences suspended by the Home Office. However, such actions do not address the underlying failures of the working environment at HLS nor the role of senior members of staff which led to these problems in the first place.
"We are therefore calling for a full, independent, public enquiry into the incidents of cruelty and other bad practices which have been uncovered at HLS and which breach the 1986 Act and the Code of Practice for the Housing and Care of Animals used in Scientific Procedures."

In the evidence, there is an account from a Mr Matthew Davis of what took place not only at that demonstration in April, but also at the later demonstration in September. I quote from his affidavit at para 7:

On 23 April 1997 the BUAV organised a publicity event outside Huntingdon Life Science Ltd ('HLS') premises in an attempt to keep the issues that had been brought to public attention by the television documentary in the public eye. There is now produced and shown to me marked 'MSGD 2' a copy of the BUAV's press release advertising that event. HLS was informed of the proposed event in advance by a letter Mike Baker wrote to Mr. Christopher Cliffe, the Chief Executive of HLS on 18 April 1997. That letter stated that members of the BUAV would be holding a peaceful publicity event outside HLS between 11.30am-1pm on 23rd April 1997, that the BUAV wished to deliver a letter of protest regarding the recent revelations uncovered...".

That letter was produced and, of course, I have already read it. Then he confirms that:
On 23 April 1997 the letter of protest was accepted by a security guard at the gates of HLS. There is now produced and shown to me a copy of that letter ... The event took place without any problems. Local media attended it."

In the next paragraph, para 8, he refers to the event of 12 September:
8. On Friday 12 September 1997 BUAV organised a street collection and collected signatures for a petition against HLS in Huntingdon. An evening meeting was scheduled for 7pm. There is now produced and shown to me marked 'MSGD 5' copies of a campaign leaflet used on that day, the petition and a press release advertising the event. The meeting started late due to poor initial attendance, although finally about twenty five people were present. I stood in for Mike Baker, who was ill, and was joined on the platform by Dr. Gill Langley of the Dr. Hadwen Trust (a charity promoting the use of non-animal methods in scientific research) and Sarah Kite, Special Projects Manger of the BUAV. The main purpose of the meeting was to show footage taken at HLS in the USA by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animal (PETA) investigators. There is now produced and shown to me marked 'MGSD 6' copies of the speeches made by myself, Dr. Langley and Ms. Kite. Once more the day's campaigning and the evening meeting passed off entirely peacefully."

Neither of those events was mentioned as giving rise to any concern in Mr Akehurst's schedule, exhibited as RCA3, of incidents which had caused problems for the plaintiffs. And, indeed, it was made clear in the evidence that the events of 12 September took place well away from what I have already referred to as "Camp Rena". Nor were either of these incidents mentioned to the Court of Appeal on 22 September. Mr Roth, for the third defendants, relies on that omission as an example of a failure on the plaintiffs' part to disclose all relevant matters on an ex parte application fully and with frankness.

In response, the plaintiffs say that they have no objection to lawful demonstrations and were only seeking to draw the court's attention to instances of harassment or unlawful conduct. That may be thought to be somewhat disingenuous when their case against the third defendants was, in the word of Schiemann LJ, "thin". They were inviting an inference by the court of guilt by association. In so far as they were aware of the way in which the third defendants had actually been conducting themselves, that was manifestly something which should have been placed before the court. The case should then have been argued on the footing that the adverse inference which they were inviting, ie. that the third defendants were authorising violence or the threat of violence, should be drawn despite the fact that the evidence in the plaintiffs' possession pointed in the opposite direction.

My attention was also drawn to another important matter; that is to say, a parliamentary answer which is reported in Hansard and exhibited before me as MJB10 to one of Mr Baker's affidavits. I need not quote it in full but it is, I think in the circumstances, necessary for me to recite part of it. It is a written answer by Mr George Howarth on 24 July 1997, to Ms. Fiona Jones, who had raised concerns about the matters which had taken place at Huntingdon Life Sciences as disclosed in the television broadcast of 26 March. Mr Howarth replied in the following terms:

We were extremely concerned about the events shown in the Channel 4 programme 'Countryside Undercover: It's A Dog's Life', and we know these concerns are shared by members of the public, and by scientists and animal technicians, the vast majority of whom are responsible and caring towards animals.

"The Home Office took prompt and firm action. On the morning after the programme was broadcast, the Home Office asked the police to investigate possible offences under the Protection of Animals Act 1911 and, as a result, two individuals have been charged with such offences. In replying to this question, we cannot therefore comment, at this time, about these two individuals or their actions as this might prejudice the prosecutions.

"The chief inspector, who heads the animals (scientific procedures) inspectorate, has also carried out a comprehensive and detailed investigation into the allegations arising from the programme and in to the management and control of animal work at the establishment. We understand that in excess of 250 man-hours of time were spent in viewing more than 20 hours of unbroadcast video material, studying journals and company records, visiting the establishment and interviewing staff (both present and ex-employees). A report detailing his findings and recommendations was submitted to the Home Office last week and we commend the chief inspector for the speed and thoroughness of his investigation.

"The investigation has shown breaches of two of the standard conditions which apply to all certificates of designation. Shortcomings relating to the care, treatment and handling of animals, and delegation of health checking to new staff of undetermined competence demonstrate that the establishment was not appropriately staffed and that animals were not at all times provided with adequate care.

"My Right Hon. Friend therefore proposes to revoke the certificate of designation for this establishment, subject to the consideration of any representations made under section 12 of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. However, if the proposed revocation took immediate effect, we estimate that up to 1,000 dogs; 10 baboons; 200 marmosets; 450 macaques; 13,000 mice; 35,000 rats; 2,000 rabbits; 4,000 guinea pigs; 3,000 birds; 4,000 fish; and smaller numbers of various other species undergoing scientific procedures would have to be destroyed. In addition, any ongoing work might need to be repeated; this would require the use of more laboratory animals. It is therefore proposed that the revocation will take effect on 30 November 1997."

In the light of that Parliamentary answer my attention was drawn to para 6 of Mr Dawes' first affidavit, which is in very brief terms:
It is also relevant..."
- that is to say, to the application before the court in September -
that the Home Office is presently considering the replacement of the First Plaintiff's Licence to conduct its business which must be issued by 30 November 1997."

It is said on behalf of the third defendants that that brief reference to the re-evaluation of the plaintiff's licence at the end of November is somewhat less than frank, especially since it is said to be relevant to the application for an injunction. Of course it is true that even allowing for lapses in the standards imposed upon the plaintiffs by Government regulation and statute, and even allowing for the convictions of members of staff of criminal offences, they are entitled not to be harassed unlawfully. That I accept without any reservation whatsoever.

The significance of that material having been excluded from the consideration of the judge and the Court of Appeal on 22 September, however, is that they were not made aware of the scope for legitimate comment and criticism by the third defendants which then existed. It was necessary, clearly, to distinguish in the relief sought between that which might be necessary to prevent violence and unlawful harassment, and that which would inevitably stifle legitimate comment on matters of undoubted public interest. That the plaintiffs singularly failed to do. It is manifest from the wide-ranging terms of the injunction sought in the writ that the plaintiffs, if they had obtained it, would be preventing any discussion or communication about the way they conducted their business at a very sensitive time.

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden has several times referred to the 1997 Act as a "victims' charter". The legislators who passed that Act would no doubt be surprised to see how widely its terms are perceived to extend by some people. It was clearly not intended by Parliament to be used to clamp down on the discussion of matters of public interest or upon the rights of political protest and public demonstration which are so much part of our democratic tradition. I have little doubt that the courts will resist any such wide interpretation as and when the occasion arises, but it is unfortunate that the terms in which the provisions are couched should be thought to sanction any such restrictions.

In the light of the conclusions I have reached, I do not need to construe any of its provisions or assess their application to the present facts. I will, however, grant the relief sought in the third defendant's summons of 20 October, both under Ord 18, r.19 and in relation to the variation of the terms of the injunction.

I should add this, although it hardly needs to be stated. The Ords I make today do not mean for one moment that any member of the BUAV is in any respect now more entitled than hitherto to harass or threaten violence against the plaintiffs or their directors or their employees, or to trespass upon their property. I have found that there is no arguable cause of action against the corporate body which is the third defendant, and that there is nothing to justify the continuance of an injunction against that body. Membership of that body carries with it to no greater extent now than before any right to break the law.

As for the plaintiff's summons, what is sought is an order under s.365 of the Companies Act 1985. I need say no more than that, the request having been made on Monday, 24 November, the statutory ten day period has not yet expired. For these applicants, the summons is therefore premature. It may be that a firm of solicitors called Wragge & Co. made a request some months ago, but since Wragge & Co. are not before me, and did not purport to be making their request on behalf of these plaintiffs, that is not a matter which I can deal with.

MR. ROTH: Your Lordship has delivered an extremely full judgment, if I may respectfully say so. Can I just pick up one or two very slight matters in it.
The first is, I think it was clearly my Lord's intention not to disclose any of the addresses of the individuals, but I think one address slipped out of a director, an address in NW3. Of course, it is not something that concerns my clients, but it may be you wish to direct that it be remove from the record.

EADY J: Yes, I so direct.

MR. ROTH: Secondly, my Lord, you referred, of course, in detail to the 1997 Act and read large parts of s.3. I think I should point out, and Mr Lawson-Cruttenden has drawn my attention to this, that ss(3)-(9) which your Lordship, or some of which your Lordship read, had not yet been brought into force.

EADY J: I see. That should be made clear at the point at which I refer to it. I do not think it has any bearing upon the decision I have made because it was purely quoted as background.

MR. ROTH: Indeed, my Lord. I just thought you might wish to make that clear.

EADY J: I am very grateful.

MR. ROTH: I, of course, ask for the third defendants' costs upon both summonses, including the cost which I am told were reserved by your Lordship on 11 November at the hearing before your Lordship, and I ask for those costs to be paid on an indemnity basis. Your Lordship has struck out the action as an abuse of process and I rely also on the observations in your judgment, my Lord, with regard to the lack of frankness in the way the matter was put before the Court of Appeal and the onus, of course, fulls upon the plaintiff seeking ex parte relief and which was not here satisfied. For both those reasons we say this is an entirely appropriate case for an order for indemnity costs.

EADY J: What do you say, Mr Lawson-Cruttenden?

MR. LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN: My Lord, I cannot resist the costs on a standard basis, but I do say this; that the plaintiff was faced with an emergency situation on the day before the plaintiff had applied for this injunction. In fact, the plaintiff went and saw Mr Justice Timothy Walker at the end of the day at 4.15 in circumstances where there were 120 demonstrators outside the plaintiff's factory the previous day and three people had broken in to the plaintiff's factory. So, my Lord, I do ask you to accept that the plaintiff was under great pressure at that time, facing serious violent actions against it and the plaintiff was doing its best to get emergency relief sought. It did not, in fact, intend in any shape or form to mislead the Court in any way. It was, in fact, in an enormous hurry to do so, and I ask for my Lord to accept that that is not a basis, in my submission, for awarding indemnity costs.

If you are with me on that, my Lord, then I would wish to make a submission about two counsel, my Lord. It may be it is not appropriate for me to make that submission at this stage.

EADY J: By all means make it now, yes, if you wish.

MR. LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN: May I ask my Lord to turn in the White Book to p 1113.

EADY J: Is it Volume 1 you are referring to?

MR. LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN: It is, my Lord.

EADY J: I do not have Volume 1 with me, I am afraid. (Pause) It is being handed up to me. I am most grateful. Yes?

MR. LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN: It is para 62/A2/9. Those are the rules which are set out and there are some very helpful criteria laid down by Mr Justice Evans in the case of Juby v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority which sets out the rules. He sets out the criteria of the nature of the case, the nature and severity, and it talks about accident cases. Then, under (b) he talks about the importance of the case to the client, the amount of damages (which is not appropriate) the general importance of the case, any particular requirements of the case, other reasons why an experienced and senior advocate may be required - and of course, over the page, my Lord (in fact, at the bottom of that paragraph), it says:

With regard to the instruction of leading counsel the correct question is not whether the case was well within the capabilities of junior counsel but rather whether or not it was reasonable to instruct leading counsel."

In my submission, my Lord, that although this is a case of some importance, it is not a case in my submission that justifies a leading counsel being instructed. There are no difficult points of law in this case and my learned friend's case was, in fact, simply "We are not responsible for these actions and therefore we should not be bound by this order". That is not a difficult case in my submission to put forward and my submission is that any costs ordered against the plaintiffs should not include a certificate for two counsel.

EADY J: I do not think I need trouble you except on the question of standard basis.

MR. ROTH: If it is simply on a standard basis, I would say this. First of all, even if my friend were right in what he said, that would take his clients only up to 17 October, when Mr Baker's affidavit was served. They could then see the full case and yet they pursued the matter, putting a further full affidavit which caused a great deal of work in response. Secondly, I would say that is not right because even up to then, it was clearly before the Court of Appeal not all defendants were made subject to an order, so a distinction was being drawn between the particular defendants at that stage and the plaintiffs. They might have been in a hurry on the day but they knew well the nature of the BUAV because the BUAV had been campaigning against them since, as your Lordship has recorded in the judgment, April if not before and putting out material. They knew exactly the nature of the organisation and could, without spending much time doing any research, have told the Court of Appeal about it. Of course, they had the letters which your Lordship has read, which you recorded were not referred to the Court of Appeal, as they should have been. So we say there is nothing in that point.

My Lord, I do not think you wish me to address you on the other matter.

EADY J: No.

MR. ROTH: The person who should address you is... No doubt Mr Lawson-Cruttenden will not complain that she is not here today.

EADY J: Thank you very much. As prayed, the third defendants are entitled to their costs, but I am not prepared to make the unusual order of indemnity costs in the circumstances of this case. Costs on the standard basis. I make no order on the basis that it was other than reasonable for two counsel to be instructed.

MR. ROTH: Might I ask your Lordship simply this? There are also the costs reserved of the hearing on 11 November, which was the subject of correspondence before the hearing when the plaintiffs were asked not once, but on several occasions, to have the matter stood out because there clearly would not be time for it to be heard. Indeed, that is exactly what happened. Letters were written, indeed specifically, drawing attention to the costs that would be wasted, and saying that they reserve the right to show those to the judge. I would ask, if I might - and I can hand those up - that the costs of that hearing when only one counsel attended should be on an indemnity basis, and make that more limited application.

EADY J: I see. They were intended to ---

MR. ROTH: That was just completely unnecessary.

EADY J: --- be embraced in the Ord I have just made.

MR. ROTH: I am so sorry.

EADY J: Certainly, I will ---

MR. ROTH: It raises a slightly different point, I think.

EADY J: --- hear what Mr Lawson-Cruttenden says about that.

MR. LAWSON-CRUTTENDEN: Your Lordship, there were two summons before me. There was a rather shorter summons under s.365 and it was thought that there was sufficient time (half an hour) to deal with that summons. What actually happened , my Lord. If as a result of that adjournment, of course, the defendants conceded the inspection that took place last Monday. So in my submission, that him was not wasted. It a responsible position of the plaintiffs to adopt and say, "Please deal with our summons." Whilst the summons was adjourned, in fact, an inspection exercise then took place and it did actually save costs in my submission, so I would resist that order my Lord, on the basis that standard costs should apply.

EADY J: I think in the circumstances the standard basis should apply also to the costs reserved on that occasion.

DISPOSITION:
Judgment accordingly
SOLICITORS:
Lawson-Cruttenden & Co; Liberty