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Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd. v Curtin and others
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
SCHIEMANN, THORPE LJJ
15 OCTOBER 1997

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden for the Applicant

SCHIEMANN LJ: Between 6.00pm and 7.45pm on 22 September 1997 the Court heard an appeal from the first two plaintiffs against the refusal of Mr Justice Timothy Walker earlier on in the day to grant an ex parte injunction against two individuals and ten other defendants who he understood were neither legal persons nor clubs but loose associations of persons with the common aim of protesting against various experiments upon animals.
The difficulties which the plaintiffs face appear from a draft affidavit by Peter Dawes and various exhibits thereto and various comments made by the advocate appearing on their behalf before us. The first plaintiff is a company which undertakes research under contract, such research involving the use of animals. The principal sites at which it conducts its activities are identified in the order which the court has made and can be referred to as the Huntingdon site, the Wilmslow site and the Eye site. The immediate background to the present situation is a hunger strike presently being conducted by Barry Horne who is presently in HMPG Bristol. While his strike is directed at the Government in support of a change of legislation concerning animal research it is in an advanced stage and it is clear from documentation being produced in the name of ‘Barry Horne’s Support Campaign’ that his supporters are using the strike to direct a campaign of harassment against the plaintiffs. An organisation known as the ‘Animal Rights Coalition’, the eighth defendant, produces a publication known as the ‘Animal Rights Coalition News’ which on 21 September 1997 advertised a ‘Permanent Protest Camp to be set up at Huntingdon Life Sciences in support of Barry’s hunger strike’. There has been a protest by various animal rights activists numbering between 10 and 100 at that site since 7 September. It has been made difficult for persons to leave and gain access to the plaintiff’s premises. The protesters stand in front of cars, shout obscenities at drivers, shout threats like ‘We know who you are and where you live’, photograph persons using video cameras, take down registration numbers of vehicles and follow the vehicles after they have left the first plaintiff’s site. On Sunday 21 September three demonstrators broke into the site and took up positions on the roof of one of the laboratories and they are, as we understand it, still there. Some 120 protesters had arrived by 1400 hours. 30 - 35 police officers were available for controlling them. It was difficult for staff to leave. They had to be let out in convoy whilst being subjected to countless threats of personal injury. The police cordon was broken. Vehicles were damaged. Rocks were thrown by protesters. Nine arrests were made. The remaining staff employed by the plaintiffs were ordered to remain on site until further police resources were drafted in. The staff were not finally able to get away until 1945 hours.

The position at the Wilmslow site is indicated by a quotation from the Animal Rights Coalition News which records an incident which occurred on 16 September as follows; “On Tuesday 35 north-west activists were besieging HLS’s Cheshire site in Wilmslow, again in solidarity with Barry. Using a familiar tactic they arrived at 7.30am forcing the laboratory to contact all its workers and organise a rendezvous point nearby. From here the workers are given a police escort, the traffic is stopped and the protesters move out of the way all leading to expense and waste of time.” For some time there have been demonstrations at the houses of the directors and, in the past two weeks at the houses of employees of the plaintiffs. Addresses and telephone numbers have appeared in London Animal Rights News and the Animal Rights Coalition has put on the internet a telephone number which can be contacted and from which, it is reasonable to deduce, these demonstrations and other manifestations of the displeasure of those who disapprove of experiments on animals can be co-ordinated. It was not only the directors who were harassed in this way but also members of staff who during the course of September have been harassed by masked demonstrators, masked men with hoods visiting their front doors and damage to their property at various points during this month.

At the Huntingdon site again people have been harried albeit to a lesser degree and at the Eye site so far nothing has happened but it is believed that protesters have plans to meet at this site on 4 October and they may now meet beforehand.
All this, says the plaintiff’s advocate, amounts to harassing within the interpretation of that word in the Protection From Harassment Act 1997 which makes clear in s 7(2) that:
“References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress.”
Section 1(1) indicates that “a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another” and s 3 indicates that an actual or apprehended breach of s 1 may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question.

There is little difficulty on the information before us in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the subject of harassment. It did occur to me that the word ‘person’ in the Act might refer merely to an individual and not to a company but the Act does not say so, on the contrary, it uses the word ‘individual’ elsewhere in references to Scotland but not in the sections with which we are concerned. In those circumstances the presumption in the Interpretation Act 1978 that ‘person’ includes ‘bodies corporate’ should prevail, at any event for the purposes of a short term injunction. In any event it seems to me following Burris v Azadani [1995] 4 All ER 802, [1995] 1 WLR 1372 that the court in principle has power to restrain conduct of the type complained of.

The difficulties which the plaintiffs face are essentially difficulties in identification. It has to be said that while the evidence of harassment is ample, the evidence that any particular person or any particular organisation is responsible is very thin. We were told by the plaintiffs’ advocate that Mr Curtin, the first defendant, was organising the protests complained of by using a loud hailer; and that Mr Watson, the second defendant, was one of those on the roof. The third defendant is the primary ante-vivisection organisation of the UK and the plaintiffs believe that many of its members were concerned in the demonstration. The fourth defendant, the Animal Liberation Front, is identified in Animal Rights Coalition News as perpetrating criminal damage to the houses of the plaintiffs’ directors. The eighth defendant appears to produce an internet site which advertises demonstrations aimed at the plaintiffs and appears to organise some if not all of the demonstrations. The same goes for London Animal Action, the twelfth defendant.

A further difficulty which the plaintiffs have is that while the first two defendants are individuals and the third defendant is believed to be a company limited by guarantee the remaining defendants have no very clear legal personality and indeed some of them appear to be newspapers. What is clear is that these demonstrations and activities are organised to a greater or lesser degree by various groups of people who give themselves various names. In those circumstances the court is not powerless to protect persons who are threatened by such groups. We are told that the judge’s reason for refusing relief were fourfold. One, that there was no evidence of harassment by the human defendants. Two, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a remedy against persons who lack a legal personality. Three, that the plaintiffs should instead call the police, and fourth that an ex parte injunction was inappropriate.

In circumstances where all that the plaintiffs seek is temporary relief from intimidation of their employees I think the judge was wrong to refuse all relief. I understand why he came to that decision because the plaintiff before him asked for relief against many more quasi organisations than before us and moreover asked for more relief than he sought before us. Even that which he sought before us we have cut down. That said, the relief which we have granted is sufficiently narrow not to deprive anyone of any right to do something which the law wishes him to be free to do. The reason the applications are ex parte is because it is very difficult to pin down responsibility on anyone. The most effective way of dealing with the problem is to order substituted service by fixing up notices in the appropriate places so that any potential demonstrator can see it and will know what he is permitted to do and what he is not permitted to do. The form of order which we have made is sufficiently clear for the police to be able to observe whether or not it is being obeyed. The defendants are restrained from any course of conduct which amounts to harassment within the meaning of the 1997 Act of the plaintiffs and various particular acts of harassment are set out and an order is made for substituted service of the order by displaying copies of the same in prominent positions along the boundary of the properties referred to in the order. Liberty is given to the defendants to apply to the Court to vary or discharge the order. The plaintiffs give the usual undertaking in damages, an undertaking to issue a writ of summons and to use their best endeavours to procure the swearing of an affidavit on the lines of the draft affidavit by Peter Dawes which has been put before us as elaborated by the advocate in his submissions.
THORPE LJ: I agree.