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R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Moseley and others
(1999) Independent, 21 June, Times, 23 June, [1999] All ER (D) 587
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION (CROWN OFFICE LIST)
ROCH LJ, COLLINS J
9 JUNE 1999

Criminal law – Harassment – Protest outside mink farm – High Court injunction in force – One defendant subject to injunction – Remaining two defendants not named in injunction – Whether defendants’ actions could be deemed to be reasonable – Protection from Harassment Act 1997, ss 1, 3

K Starmer for the Appellants Moseley and Selvanayagam
J Chipperfield for the Appellant Woodling

Crown Prosecution Service, Northumberland; Liberty Legal Department; Kieran & Co, Derbyshire

COLLINS J: This is an appeal by way of case stated by the DPP against the acquittal of the three respondents on charges under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, alleging that each had pursued a course of conduct which amounted to harassment of Peter John Harrison.

The offence in the case of Miss Moseley was alleged to have been committed between 20 July 1997 and 21 January 1998, and those in the case of the other two respondents, Mr Woodling and Miss Selvanayagam, between 20 July 1997 and 20 March 1998.

The offences arose from protests being carried out at a mink farm run by Mr Harrison at Kirkley Hall in Northumberland. He and his family (that is his wife and two children) lived in a house near the entrance to the farm and the protesters, who included the three respondents, had gathered to object to mink farming. The farm itself was licensed by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food and there was no evidence that any contraventions of the relevant regulations had taken place.

The summonses came before a stipendiary magistrate, Mr Neville White. They were heavily contested and he heard evidence over a period of eight days between 29 July and 25 September 1998.

On 13 October 1998, he gave a short judgment, acquitting the defendants.

The Director of Public Prosecutions requested that he state a case, raising five questions. The magistrate agreed to state the case but on two questions only. That is the case that is before us.

He took the view that the other three questions raised issues of fact, not of law. The Director wishes to challenge that and has sought leave to move for judicial review. The parties have submitted, and we have agreed, that the case before us could sensibly proceed since it raised discrete issues which, if decided against the respondents, might render the judicial review academic. No argument has been presented to us in relation to the proposed judicial review. However, for my part, I should express my reservations whether judicial review rather than an application to amend the case is the correct route.

The case itself is most unsatisfactory, in that it does not contain sufficient clearly stated facts. I am conscious it is desirable if possible to avoid unnecessary expenditure of costs, and so, despite the deficiencies in the case, I have found it possible to reach a conclusion on the first question raised in it. Since the Director has not asked us to remit the case for further facts to be found, a conclusion on the second question must be reached based on what is before the court.

With that introduction, I should first refer to the relevant provisions of the 1997 Act. Section 1, the side note of which reads Prohibition of Harassment, reads as follows:

“(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct -
(a) which amounts to harassment of another; and
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment.

(2) For the purposes of this section the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a course conduct if the person who pursued it shows it was
(a) pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime;
(b) that it was pursued under enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person, under any enactment; or
(c) in the particular circumstances, the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.”
Section 2 creates the offence, which is a summary offence carrying a maximum of 6 months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both, of which a person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1 is guilty.

Section 7 defines harassment as including alarming a person or causing a person distress, and a course of conduct must involve conduct on at least two occasions.

Mr Starmer, on behalf of Miss Moseley and Miss Selvanayagam, also drew our attention to section 3 of the Act, the provisions of which were not in force at the material time. In particular, he referred to subsection (3), which reads:
“Where in such proceedings [that is to say, civil proceedings by a person who may be the victim of the course of conduct in question] the High Court or the County Court grants an injunction for the purpose of restraining the defendant pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment; and
(b) the plaintiff considers the defendant has done anything which he is prohibited from doing by the injunction the plaintiff may apply for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant.”

If the warrant is issued, and there has been a breach of the injunction, a specific criminal offence is established. That is subsection (6), which reads:
“Where a High Court or County Court grants an injunction for the purpose mentioned in subsection (3)(a) and
(b) without reasonable excuse the defendant does anything which he is prohibited by doing by the injunction he is guilty of an offence.”
That offence is an indictable offence which carries a maximum of 5 years imprisonment. I shall come shortly to the relevance that Mr Starmer submits is to be found in those provisions.

Whatever may have been the purpose behind the Act, its words are clear, and it can cover harassment of any sort. Thus there may, perhaps in many instances there will be a need for the court to balance the interests of the victim of the harassment against the rights of the person carrying out the course of conduct which amounts to harassment. Those rights will include, in an appropriate case, the right to protest peacefully. Indeed, the provisions of section 1(3)(c) in particular recognise that it might be reasonable to harass in certain circumstances.

The defence we are told sought to rely not only on section 1(3)(c), but also on section 1(3)(a). I am bound to say, I find it difficult to see how a protest of this sort, carried on over a lengthy period of time, could be said to have been pursued for the purpose of detecting or preventing crime. It is no crime to run a mink farm and as the magistrate found, there was never any evidence of breaches of any regulations covering the manner in which the minks had to be kept.

I should now turn to the case itself. The magistrate introduces it by referring to the length of time over which he heard evidence, and goes on:
“I will restrict the findings of fact to those necessary only for the purpose of specific questions involved in the appeal.”

He continues:
“I found:
1. That over the period of time covered by the informations the three defendants, and from time to time a number of other people, attended at the premises of Corneyhaugh Mink Farm, mainly outside the bounders of the property but occasionally within the perimeter. Selvanayagam in particular admitted being there over 100 times in a period of 8 months.

2. That the conditions were such as to satisfy me that the animals themselves were being kept in unnatural circumstances so as to entitle right thinking members of the public, had they known of them, to feel distressed. However, Corneyhaugh Mink Farm is a farm licensed by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food under the Mink Keeping Order and other relevant legislation. No evidence was produced that Mr Harrison has ever been prosecuted for any offence contrary to the Mink Keeping Regulations.”

He then refers in paragraph 3 to the section 1(3)(a) defence having been raised. He continues:
“4. That the behaviour of the three defendants amounted to harassment of Peter John Harrison, the owner of the farm.

5. That the defendants new or ought to have known their behaviour amounted to harassment.”
He then refers in paragraph 6 to an injunction which had been obtained by Mr Harrison. He records:
“That on 10th September 1997 Peter John Harrison obtained an injunction from the High Court, a copy of which is annexed. In this injunction the defendant, Diane Valerie Selvanayagam but neither of the other two defendants, was named specifically, and that copies of the injunction and the map concerned were served on [her] and also posted prominently around the premises in such a way that the other defendants would be aware of it.

I was entirely satisfied that all three defendants must have been aware of the existence of the injunction but not necessarily of its full contents.”

There is then an irrelevant reference to a case, and he goes on:
“That Ms Selvanayagam, acting for herself, served a timely defence on Mr Harrison’s solicitors and on the court and requested the removal of the injunction. At the time of the instant trial she was still awaiting a reply and an opportunity to challenge the injunction.”
That was almost 12 months since the injunction had been granted. As we shall see, it contained the usual provision that an application could be made to the court on 24 hour’s notice to discharge it. The magistrate went on in the case, at paragraph 7:
“That the activities of the defendants continued after the granting, serving and display of the injunction.”

And then he states in paragraph 8:
“That the behaviour of the defendants, disregarding any activities which may have been carried out by others for which the defendants were in no way responsible, was in all the circumstance reasonable.”

That purports to be a finding of fact; in a sense it is, but it is really a conclusion he reaches founded upon the evidence that he heard. Unfortunately he does not vouchsafe any of the facts which led him to reach that particular conclusion. He goes on:
“Dealing, as I am asked to do, with the relevance of the injunction on the question of reasonableness, the prosecution mentioned in opening the fact of its having been obtained and that because it was well displayed the defendants ought to have known that they should not behave as they did. In assisting me as to the law, the prosecution accepted Miss Selvanayagam was the only one of the three defendants specifically named in the injunction. They submitted that although breach of the injunction could not itself constitute evidence of harassment such a breach would prevent the defendants, in particular, Miss Selvanayagam, from claiming that they were acting reasonably. As a point of law actions which were in breach of an injunction could not be held to be reasonable.

The defence contended that all the circumstances must be taken into account in deciding whether if conduct was reasonable - a balancing exercising must be undertaken by the court between the activities of the protesters, the purpose of the protest and the effect it had on the ‘victim’. The injunction was granted based on evidence contained in an affidavit only. The injunction had been obtained on its own evidence and therefore could not of itself and as a matter of law preclude the present court from finding that the behaviour of the defendants was reasonable.”

He then refers to various authorities which were cited to him and concludes:
“Having heard eight days of evidence and argument I was entirely of the opinion that the behaviour of all three defendants was reasonable. I took the fairly unusual step in a Magistrates’ Court of reading a brief written judgment of which I annex a copy. The High Court is asked by the prosecution to answer the following two questions:

1. Whether as a matter of law the course of conduct pursued by the defendant Selvanayagam could have been deemed to be reasonable having regard to the fact that the course of conduct was in breach of the terms of the High Court injunction, served on [her] on 10th September of 1997.

2. Whether as a matter of law the course of conduct pursued by the defendants Woodling and Moseley could have been deemed to be reasonable when both defendants were aware of the existence and general terms of the said High Court injunction.”

The short judgment adds very little by way of findings of fact but does indicate the basis upon which the magistrate appears to have reached his conclusion that the harassment in question was reasonable. He refers to the balancing exercise, and says he has to balance the effect of the defendants’ activities on Mr Harrison and his family on the one hand, and the purpose and nature of the protest on the other. He goes on:
“Fur farming is a business which for many years, has aroused public concern, such concern that in this country at least the number of garments made from the products has very considerably reduced. Indeed things have now gone so far that the government has recently announced an intention to outlaw the practice of mink farming entirely.

This has to suggest that in the view of the public, expressed through an elected parliament, the trade is considered bad, and this is in turn an item to add to the scales in considering the balancing exercise.

In other words, it may be easier to justify campaigning against something which can be shown to be at the very least unpopular, even though presently lawful, in the eyes of the public.”

He goes on to indicate that the three defendants had not been guilty of any misbehaviour in the course of the protest and indeed had gone out of their way to try to prevent any such misbehaviour occurring as the result of the activities of anyone else involved in the protest.

For my part, I find it difficult to see how the suggested views of the government could be material at all in the exercise that the magistrate had to undertake. However, that matter has not been argued before us. It does appear that the magistrate approached his task purely on the general basis that, in his view, the manner in which the protest had been carried out and the purpose of the protest was such that he was able to find that it was reasonable. There is no suggestion that there had been any change in the manner in which the protest had been carried out, or the purpose of it since the injunction was granted, because the course of conduct, as is apparent from the dates alleged, commenced some 2 months before the injunction was granted and continued, in the one case, until January, and in the other two cases, until March some months after the injunction was in force.

I should refer specifically to the injunction, because it is the injunction which has led to the questions that are asked of us and it is central to the arguments which we have heard. The injunction contains a plan and there are three separate colours, green, red and yellow, indicating certain areas on it. The injunction is an interim injunction, and was, as I have already said, granted ex parte. I should say that the defendants are Miss Selvanayagam (who is named in the injunction as Diane Sanderson but it is accepted and indeed the magistrate, as I have recorded, so found that she is Miss Selvanayagam), Dave Robson, Laura Nichol and a body called Newcastle Animal Rights Coalition. Those defendants were the specific named defendants against whom the injunction was granted. The order is in these terms:

“The Defendants be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, their servants or agents, or any of them, or otherwise how so ever from pursuing a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of any of the Plaintiffs and in particular from: [I should say the plaintiffs are Mr Harrison and his family]

(a) assaulting, molesting, harassing threatening, pestering or otherwise interfering with the Plaintiffs by doing acts to cause them, their families, servants agents, employees or customers harm whether directly or indirectly;

(b) making any communication to the Plaintiffs, their servants, agent, employees or customers whether in writing or orally, whether by telephone or otherwise how so ever save that they may send written communication to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors;

(c) from coming or remaining or trespassing on the land edged read on the Plan annexed hereto being land owned by the Plaintiffs’ and comprising Cornyhaugh and Mill Hills Mink Farm;

(d) from coming or remaining or trespassing on the land edged green on the Plan annexed hereto being land immediately neighbouring the Plaintiffs’ said land;

(e) from coming or remaining on the public highway including the verges, ditches, trees, fences and hedgerows abutting the same between the points marked A to B coloured yellow on the plan annexed hereto being that part of the public highway immediately abutting the land referred to in (c) and (d) above;

(f) from conducting any demonstration or protesting activities within the land referred to in (c), (d) and (e) above.”

The effect of that injunction, so far as the prohibition upon being or trespassing in particular areas is concerned, was that the defendants were prohibited from going on any part of the plaintiff’s land (the mink farm in question) or neighbouring land close thereto, or the highway. The land close thereto, and the highway, involved a prohibition from being near the plaintiffs’ family home.

It would have been open to the protesters to carry out their protest a reasonable distance away from the plaintiff’s home. It may well be that the reason for the prohibition area chosen was to ensure that they were kept at a reasonable distance from the plaintiffs’ home, and thus the harassment of the plaintiff and his family would be kept to a minimum. The injunction went on to order further that:

“For the purposes of this Order any person who is pursuing a course of conduct involving any harassment of the Plaintiffs and is either in concert with any of the Defendants or who has been given notice of the terms of this Order shall be bound by the terms of this Order.”

It records:
“In this Order ‘harassment’ bears the same meaning as in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.”

There are the usual undertakings, in the form of a cross undertaking in damages, an order for substituted service by displaying copies of the order in prominent positions along the boundaries of the properties referred to in clauses 1(c) and (d) and at points marked A and B on the plan annexed to the order. The points A and B are at either end of the limited of the part of the highway upon which protesting was to be prohibited. There was, as I have already said, the unusual indication that the defendants could apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge the order on giving at least 24 hours written notice to the plaintiffs’ solicitors.

Mr Addison, on behalf of the Director, submitted that it cannot be reasonable to harass a person if the conduct in question constitutes a breach of an injunction. Mr Starmer accepted that the injunction was a relevant consideration, but submitted that the magistrate was entitled, indeed bound, to decide for himself whether the course of conduct was reasonable. Section 3, he submitted, was there to deal with breaches of an injunction and makes clear that there is no offence committed if there was a reasonable excuse for any breach that was established. It would be quite wrong, he submitted, for section 2 to be used as a means of circumventing the provisions of section 3. Accordingly, if the prosecution chose to bring a charge under section 2, the injunction could not prevent the magistrate from deciding for himself whether the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable or indeed was covered by any of the other defences which are set out in section 1(3).

It seems to me that the magistrate was not entitled to go behind the injunction. I find it difficult, if not impossible, to envisage circumstances in which the pursuit of a course of conduct amounting to harassment in breach of an injunction could be reasonable within terms of section 1(3)(c). There have been suggestions raised in the course of argument that, for example, attempts to rescue someone in danger of injury might excuse a trespass which was otherwise forbidden. That might well constitute a reasonable excuse for a breach on a given occasion of an injunction, but it is difficult to see how that sort of thing could apply to a course of conduct. It would inevitably, one would have thought, be an isolated event.

Mr Chipperfield submitted that it could happen on more than one occasion and thus constitute a course of conduct. That seems to me, as a matter of fact, to be a somewhat unrealistic suggestion. Be that as it may, the magistrate clearly did not rely on any factual matters such as an attempted rescue or anything which could have taken this case out of the ordinary. As I have indicated from the case itself and from the judgment that he gave, he clearly took the view that he was entitled to carry out the balancing exercise for himself and in effect to ignore the injunction.

He sought to justify that by saying that the injunction was based on affidavit evidence only and had been granted ex parte. Mr Starmer accepted that if it had been granted following a hearing, and if the High Court had carried out the balancing exercise he would be in some difficulty. But he submitted that an ex parte injunction might fall into a different position.

That seems to me to be an impossible argument. The injunction, if granted, must be obeyed, and unless and until it is set aside, it binds the party in question. It cannot be right for an individual to say to him or herself, that he or she will ignore the terms of the injunction because he or she believes that the conduct in question is reasonable.

The course that must be adopted is to apply to set the injunction aside. The judge will then decide whether the conduct is reasonable, or should be prevented. He will carry out the balancing exercise. But, as it seems to me, it is incumbent upon a magistrate, faced with an injunction, to accept that it means that the defendant is unable to discharge the burden placed upon him by the Act of establishing that the conduct was reasonable.

For my part, I find it quite impossible to accept that it can be reasonable to pursue a course of conduct in breach of an injunction which is designed to stop such conduct. There is no suggestion that Miss Selvanayagam, who is the only defendant directly named in the injunction, was doing other than to continue to protest, notwithstanding the injunction obtained against her. She decided to continue her protest. Mr Starmer submitted that the harassment in the terms of the injunction could only arise if section 1 of the Act was transgressed. Thus there could be no harassment, so no breach of the injunction, if any, of the section 1(3) offences existed. That seems to me to be clearly wrong. Harassment is defined in section 7 of the Act and indeed the injunction refers to that definition. That is what has to be established, namely that there was harassment and the existence of the injunction will negative the section 1(3) defence. However, in the circumstances of this case, it is perhaps not necessary to base my conclusion on that point. The injunction prohibited the going on to particular areas. There is a finding in the case that the protests were mainly outside the boundaries of the property, but occasionally within the perimeter. There is no specific finding, it is true, that the protest took place on the road within the prohibited area or on the adjoining property within the prohibited area. But the finding in paragraph 1 of the case, coupled with the terms of first question, which reads:

“Having regard to the fact that the course of conduct was in breach of the terms of the injunction” makes it clear to me that the protests did include a breach of the parts of the injunction which prohibited going on particular areas.

In those circumstances, in the light of the finding, there was a breach of the injunction. It seems to me it is quite impossible for Miss Selvanayagam to establish that she had a defence within the terms of section 1(3)(c). Accordingly, I would answer the first question in the negative.

The other two defendants are in a somewhat different position. They were not named in the injunction and so any case against them, based on the existence of the injunction, must depend on the further paragraph in the order which reads, and I repeat it:
“For the purposes of this Order any person who is pursuing a course of conduct involving any harassment of the Plaintiffs and is either acting in concert with any of the Defendants or who has been given notice of the terms of this Order shall be bound by the terms of this Order.”

The only findings of fact in relation to the state of knowledge of Miss Moseley and Mr Woodling is to be found in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of the case where the learned magistrate says:
“I was entirely satisfied that all three defendants must have been aware of the existence of the injunction but not necessarily of its full contents.”

Mr Addison submitted that the order for substituted service, which required that the order was prominently posted, should be sufficient to enable the court to reach the conclusion that, notwithstanding the absence of a specific finding of fact to that effect, the two defendants must have been aware not only of the existence of the injunction but also of its terms. The problem with that submission is that the magistrate does not say that. He is satisfied, he says, that they were aware of the existence of the injunction but not necessarily of the full contents. That is the crucial point. We do not know what contents they were or may have been unaware of. What they must have been aware of, in order to establish that they were also liable, was that the terms included a prohibition upon Miss Selvanayagam from going on particular parts of the land. Thus they must have known, in order to have been in breach of the injunction, that they were forbidden to go on on the particular parts and there must have been a finding against them that they did go with that knowledge on those particular parts. There is no such finding.

Alternatively, it must have been established that they were acting in concert with Miss Selvanayagam. Of course, she was there and they were there. But, there is no finding before us which, in my view, entitles the inference to be drawn that they were acting in concert with her, so far as the terms of the injunction are concerned.

The findings of fact are, in my judgment, wholly inadequate to support the contentions made by Mr Addison that the two defendants in question are caught by the terms of the injunction. It does not help him, in my judgment, to refer to aiding and abetting, because the knowledge that has to be established for that is essentially the same knowledge as would have to be established in order to create a breach by them of the terms of the injunction.

In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is not possible to say that question 2 should be answered in a way which means that they were not entitled to have the defence of reasonableness found in their favour. The question itself indicates only that they were aware of the existence and the general terms of the High Court injunction, not of the relevant terms, which would have placed them in breach of that injunction.

We have not been asked in this case stated to consider whether the magistrate was otherwise entitled to conclude that the defendant’s conduct was reasonable. If the injunction had not existed he was, as it seems to me, entitled, as a matter of fact, to carry out the balancing exercise and to decide that the conduct was reasonable. However surprising that decision may appear, in the light of the material which has been placed before this Court, that is what magistrates are there to do, to determine issues of fact. It is only if their determination is such that no reasonable person could reach that conclusion that this Court can interfere. From the information that has been put before us, I am bound to say that it would, I think, be difficult for that burden to be discharged by the prosecutor. But I emphasise that we have not had any detailed material put before us to enable any conclusion to be reached upon that point. Suffice it to say that, so far as the two defendants other than Miss Selvanayagam are concerned, the answer to the second question is in the affirmative.

The effect of my findings may be considered when my Lord has given his judgment.

ROCH LJ: I agree. The stipendiary magistrate’s findings of fact are spare and are insufficient to result in a conclusion that the respondents Joanna Moseley and Stephen Woodling, were bound by the terms of the injunction issued by Poole J, on 10 September 1997. Consequently, in my judgment, the fact of the injunction was not, in their cases, one of the particular circumstances that had to be considered by the stipendiary magistrate when deciding whether the courses of conduct they pursued were reasonable.

As the stipendiary magistrate found, the injunction apart, that their behaviour had been reasonable they were entitled to be acquitted of the offences under section 2 of the Protection of Harassment Act 1997, with which they had been charged.

The position of Miss Selvanayagam was different. She was subject to the injunction made Poole J. Although the stipendiary magistrate did not make a specific finding that Miss Selvanayagam acted in breach of that injunction, the first question which reads:

“Whether as a matter of law the course of conduct pursued by the defendant Selvanayagam could have been deemed to be reasonable having regard to the fact that the course of conduct was in breach of terms of the High Court injunction, served on the defendant Selvanayagam on 10th September 1997?”

That is not a sensible question unless the stipendiary magistrate had been satisfied that she had acted in breach of that injunction.

The terms of the injunction are important. The injunction prohibited the defendant in the civil action not merely from pursuing a course of conduct, which amounted to harassment, as defined in the 1997 Act, of any member of the Harrison family, but to refrain from coming on to the Harrison’s land and to refrain from going on to the road outside the farm between points A and B, on the map attached to and forming part of the injunction.

The purpose of those terms was to prevent the defendants in the civil action, that is Miss Selvanayagam, Mr Robson, and a Miss Nichol, together with the Newcastle Animal Rights Coalition, from demonstrating immediately outside the Harrison’s farmhouse.

It would not have stopped peaceful demonstrations on the road, approaching the farm, beyond points A and B. That order allowed for application to be made by the defendants in the civil action for the order to be discharged or varied.

One of the submissions made by counsel for the respondents in their skeleton argument in paragraph 21, at page 10 was this:
“A criminal tribunal of fact, is entitled to take the view that allegations advanced on an ex parte basis in support of an injunction, are untrue, exaggerated, or simply not made out on the evidence. In such circumstances, it must be open to that tribunal to determine that a defendant’s behaviour was reasonable under section 1(3)(c), or was a reasonable excuse under section 3(6).”

In my judgment, that submission is completely wrong. It ignores the fact that parties seeking an injunction, support their application by evidence given in affidavit form, and are subject to the same obligations to be accurate and truthful as a witness who gives oral evidence and are subject to the same sanctions if they are not.

Moreover, such a party is under an obligation to disclose all matters material to the application for an injunction, including matters known to them, which could militate the granting of the injunction sought. It is, in my opinion, to be presumed that the injunction, although ex parte and interim, has been obtained properly, and it is to be obeyed until it expires, or is set aside or varied by the High Court. A person who is aware that he or she is subject to an injunction, made by the High Court, and who can apply to set it aside or to vary it, cannot be conducting him or herself reasonably if he or she deliberately and without reasonable excuse breaks the terms of the injunction.

Miss Selvanayagam was in breach of the injunction, in two respects. She was upon the road outside farm between points A and B, and she on occasions trespassed on the Harrisons’ land.

The particular circumstances, against which the reasonableness of that course of conduct had to be measured, included the existence of the High Court order. There was no justification put forward by Miss Selvanayagam either before the stipendiary magistrate or before this Court, for her disobeying the order of the High Court. I personally doubt, although the matter does not arise specifically in this case, whether trespassing on a person’s land, as opposed to peacefully demonstrating in the road outside the land, or on neighbouring land, if the owner of the neighbouring land permits, can ever be a course of conduct which is reasonable.

What is certain, in my judgment, is that conduct which flouts a High Court order cannot be reasonable and unless there exists a wholly exceptional excuse for doing so, such as the instance put forward by Mr Starmer during argument, that it is necessary to go into a prohibited area to rescue someone who is in imminent danger. Any other view could lead to inconsistent conclusions beings reached by the magistrates’ court and the High Court; a most undesirable result.

For these reasons, and those given by my Lord, I would answer the first question no, and would direct that the case of Miss Selvanayagam go back to stipendiary magistrate to be dealt with by him in the light of the judgments which have been given in this Court.